MAPS
. This conference was one of the annual series held in Edinburgh addressing different aspects of Africanist studies, and arose from a belief that little work and dialogue had been undertaken considering the ways in which nationhood and citizenship are negotiated in reference to states and borders. In recent years civil wars and conflicts across Africa have continued, and the number of conflicts over states and nationhood that we have witnessed since the holding of the conference serves to underline the topicality and importance of this issue. ' 'Vhat these conflicts, and the many others still continuing, demonstrate is the complexity of nation and state building processes. The papers explore many of these intricacies and provide analysis of the causes and consequences of the ongoing struggle for identities. Emphasising the role of the state, and the continued prescience of borders, these papers interrogate the processes th.rough which citi.zenship is defined, naL"ions made, and the political expressions of these constructions.
In compiling these papers we must extend our thanks to a number of people and organisations, including to the rest of the organising committee of the conference for their assistance in orchestrating and running the event. ·we are grateful to our contributors for their patience and co-operation whilst we finalised the publication. vVe must also thank the Binks Trust, the British Academy, the Royal African Society and African Studies Association UK, and the British Council (Pretoria) for their financial support to the conference. Permission to print Ru th Marshall-Fratani's paper, At the close of the twentieth century much conventional wisdom about the trajectory of Africa was finally jettisoned by policy-makers and academics alike. African states appeared to be cliverging ever more profoundly from the model of the nation-state, but without it being clear what was taking its place. To many, it seemed that the fiction surrouncling statehood was finally being exposed for all to see, with much of the continent being left without functioning states or even 'politics' in the sense of negotiated solutions to routine decision-making. African states seemed destined to be filed in some 'other' catego ry, while the rest of the world wrestled with the rather different problems of reconciling entrenched nation-statism with the pressures of globalisation.
In fact, things have not panned out as the 'realists' preclicted.
Although there has been a breakdown of order within many African countries, there have been just as many attempts to revive the state-as has been the case in formerly war-torn Mozambique or Sierra Leone.
Moreover~ nationalism certainly has not become a relic of the past. On the contrary, in a number of cases there has been noticeable increase in the salience of appeals to nationalism which cannot simply be regarded as opportunistic. Indeed, as Crawford Young reminds us we have seen that "states may entirely collapse without disappearing as nations from the social imat,rinary" {this volume: 24 1). The discourses of nationalism and ethnicity have instead run in parallel witl1in and across states, sometimes clashing and at otl1er times cross-fertilising one another, the reason being that they occupy a great deal of common ground. The weakening of central authority might have been expected to empower those seeking to openly deploy the language of ethnici ty, but when so much has been up for grabs it has been possible for actors at the maq,rins to seek to remould nationalism in a way which re-defines who belongs and who does not, a particular ' The authors extend their thanks to all of those who commented on this chapter, in particular to .B.Iair Ruthe. dord and Sam J:lickey.
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SARA OORMAJ'I, OM<IEL ~I.AMME·rr AND PAUL NUCENT form of the "politics of recognition" (Englund and Nya~joh 2004). In the context of diminishing resources, defining the boundaries and meaning of citizenship is considered an issue of paramount importance in many countries. And this means that politics, in the sense referred to above, is very much alive.
It is arguably in the nature of nationalism to distinguish insiders from outsiders, but because this is occurring against the backdrop of acute economic distress and state reconstruction, the process is especially fi-aught in Africa. Putting it crudely, the stakes are much higher. There is scarcely a country on the continent where the state of the nation and the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion have not been debated in recent times, and in many instances violent conflict has ensued. This volume speaks, therefore, to some of the most important issues affecting contempora1y Africa: who belongs to the nation, what is the status of lower order identities and how are resources divvyed up and ring-fenced as a consequence? The contributors, who arc renowned experts in their countries of expertise, address the historical roots of national and ethnic identities, explore how these have shifted over time, identify the matc1ial and symbolic resources which arc contested, and weigh up the relative importance of elite manipulation and subaltern agency. Although other cases would also merit inclusion most of the obvious candidates are examined. The remainder of this introduction teases out some of the sub-themes and draws out the links between the individual contributions in order to assist the reader to establish a clearer sense of the whole.
The Stale qf the Naiirms
In recent times, considerable attention has been paid to d1e Afi·ic..'ln state (Samatar and Samatar 2002; Herbst 2000; O lukoshi and Laakso 1996; Boone 2005) or Jack thereof (Reno 1998; Dunn 2005; Boas 2005} in academic debates. But, in order to make sense of recent conflicts over land, borders and resources, within and between African states, we need to start by examining the interaction between state and nation, and how we conceptualise them. To start with the state, the relationship between pre-existing political forms, in aU their diversity, and the colonial state was a rather complex one. For the first three decades of the twentieth century, colonial states were not that statish at all. They were minimalist, fiscally constrained and highly personalised. In non-set-der Africa, the colonial re1:,rimes often battened onto the existing power structure, adapting structures of tax gathering (as in Northern Nigeria) and 1.1sing the charismatic and coercive force of African ru lers. In settler states, there was much less accommodation, especially given the reality of land seizures, but the personalised nature of white rule was no less pronounced, while tl1e tax system was highly skewed towards Africans. As Cooper and others have pointed out, it was only in the twilight years of colonialism after the Second World War that colonial states had the fiscal and administrative capacity to assume many of the functions one normally associates with the state (Cooper 1996) .
Within a decade, decolonisation had led to the hasty transfer of power to Afhcans, but with the job of creating functioning states left essentially unfinished. The economic boom years which accompanied independence encouraged the belief that this would still be possible, but these conditions did not last. The 1970s witnessed the shocks of the global oil crisis and drought and by the 1980s the economies of most countries were in dire straits, states lacked the resources to carry out the most basic functions (such as paying school teachers on a regular basis) and personalised rule became more obvious. This has been much commented upon, but what perhaps needs to be underlined is that state-building was still work in progress at the time of independence. Many of the issues which were not resolved by tl1en-for example the registration of title to land-became acutely contentious at the turn of millennium.
Nationalism in Africa has been the topic of study since the early years of independence (Hodgkin 1956; Lonsdale 1968; Kedourie 1971; Smith 1983 ), but we agree with Chipkin's argument that the task of defining the term ' nation' has been "sorely neglected in .. . Africanist scholarship" (2005: 13<1-) . Whereas the early literature focused on the political aspects of nationalism, and in particular the ending of foreign domination, it soon became obvious that there had to be more to nationalism than that. Like states, nations were embryonic at the time of independence. In some territories like Nige1ia and tl1e Sudan the constituent units had only been encouraged to tl1ink of themselves as sharing a national space on the eve of independence. In otl1er cases, like Uganda, colonialism produced acute manifestations of uneven development which made it difficult to build a sense of sharing in a common citizenship. Where traditional authorities retained substantive powers, there was an additional hurdle which had to be negotiated. Arguably, the fact that the borders between African states were 'artificial' and 6 SARA OORMAJ'I, OM<IEL ~I.AMME·rr AND PAUL NUCENT enclosed un-related peoples is not the most important reason why the national project had its problems (Hastings 1977; N ugent 2002 Putting it simply, the national question, as it was posed around the time of independence, turned on the problems of ensuring the perception of equal treatment, measured in terms of resource allocation and the definition of appropriate values and symbols lor all the constituent parts of the nation. In many countries, like Nigeria, this came to be perceived as a zero sum game, often with tragic consequences. The post-colonial state provides the legal and material resources over which conflicts occur (Alien 1995; Young 1994) , but the nation provides the legitimating framework behind such sn·uggles. While material resources-access to land, opportunities and jobs--are often at stake, these conflicts are potent and meaningful for their contestants because they are framed and understood in terniS of identity and belonging.
This brings us neatly to issues surrounding etlmicity. By contrast with nationalism, ethnicity has almost been debated to deatl1 in tl1e last two decades (Spear 2003) . The debate has turned very largely on the historicity of ethnicity: that is, whether ethnic groups or 'tribes' were rooted in older identities or were colonial inventions/constructions. Studies of nineteenth century Africa, "have emphasized that far from there being a single 'tribal' identity, most Africans moved in and out of multiple identities" (Ranger 1985: 248) . Ranger goes on to state that the twentieth century saw an "immobilization of populations, reinforcement of ethnicity and rigidity of social definition" as a consequence of colonial political and economic changes (1985: 249). There is now an emerging consensus that ratl1er than looking for decisive ruptures, it would be more helpful to see identities as in a constant process of mutation from tl1e nineteentl1 century clown to the present-and to acknowledge that tl1e process has not come to a stop (Lentz and Nugent 2000) .
If nations are 'imagined' (Anderson 1991 ) , and if the contents of that imaginative package may shili over time, precisely the same is true of ethnicity (Ranger 1985; Vail 1989 , Brennan 1990 . Some imponant consequences follow from this Htct. While some actors seek to define who belongs to the nation and what it means to be a good citizen, other actors are constantly seeking to deline the boundaries and moral universe of the ethnic group (Berman and Lonsdale 1992) . \<\There the ethnic group in question crosses an international border, or where the self-proclaimed nationalists seek to marginalise members of a particular group, sources of dissonance and potential conflict arises between the actors in question. But there is also scope for negotiation. Hence culture brokers of d1e ethnic group may seek to lend their definition of moral rectitude to the nation as a whole. For example, d1e Kikuyu variant of valuing private wealth accumulation was carried over to Kenya as a whole during the Kenyatta period. In Ghana, the Ashanti variant on the same theme was regarded as a d1reat by Kwame Nkrumah whose architects of nationalism instead sought to define national values in a mixture of statism and collectivism. Equally, ethnic actors may seek help from state actors in defining their rivals as illegitimate claimants. The weakening of the political cenu·e at the turn of the millennium led to precisely this bargaining in a country like Cote d'Ivoire as local actors sought validation for their own exclusionary strategies, and eventua lly won. Electoral democracy merely gave a different form to the bargaining process: "reduced to mere electoral competition for control of the state's resources, democracy reinforced opportunism" (Nolutshungu 1990: 91) . Having briefly discussed d1e dynamic interaction between nation, state and ethnic group, we turn to some of the themes which recur in the pages of this volume.
Diverse People Unite!
Reacting to these internal divisions, many Aftican states experimented with broadly inclusive nation-building strategies after Independence. In addition to new political institutions designed to minimise centrifugal tendancies, cultural manifestations of nation-building--anthems, flags, clothes, football teams, and musical icons-were also orchestrated fi-om the centre. (Allman 2004; Apter 2005; Askew 2002; Barnard 2004; Burgess 2002; Cusack 2003; Tvaska 2002; Turino 2000) . In a country such as Tanzania under Nyerere or Ghana under Nkrumah, tl1is was part of a conscious effort to suppress allegiance to ethnic symbols. These nation-building efforts rarely led to overt conflict, despite tensions over privileging of certain cultural forms, the sidelining of those perceived as 'backward' (Allman 2004) , and the gendering of the national body: 8 SARA OORMAJ'I, OM<IEL ~I.AMME·rr AND PAUL NUCENT ... o ne of the disasters o ur continent has faced has been the political failure of nationalism. Because the nation has come to mean an urban, male, African e lite and very often a particular tribal group that has assu med the identity o f the nation and through that excluded just about everybody else.
2 Nation-building comprised a vocabulary, and sometimes a practice, of inclusion, but both implicitly and explicitly shaped assumptions about how members of the nation should live, behave and identity themselves (Cusack 2003; Ivaska 2002; Hansen 2004) . It also carried within it exclusionary tendencies, which became more pronounced at times of political or economic crisis. Geschiere and Nyamnjoh suggest that in recent years, "[l]nstead of promoting national citizenship, as implied by the idea of 'nation-building' that dominated politics in the 1970s and 1980s, these regimes now seem to be more intent on producing 'autochthons'" (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000: 425) . At their most instrumental, these strategies attempted to use colonial era citizenship to determine their eligibility of presidential canclidates in Zambia, Uganda and Cote d'lvoire (Whitaker 2005}. Yet, we would argue that those very nation-building strategies themselves contained the seeds of the present polarisation. It is certainly true tl1at in the 1990s, as the African state was increasingly beset by economic crises, and political tensions, we saw the emergence of shlillel~ more competitive discourses: "[d]emocratisation, even partial, dramatically raised the stakes of citizenship" (Young this volume: 242) . Under the pressure to hold multi-party elections, leaders (national and local), feared iliat they were about to be excluded from the spoils of power, and sought to manipulate citizenship and reddine nationhood; making nations by creating strangers. While political and economic liberalisation constitute the current configuration against which identi ty politics are played out, the interaction of local and global influences threaten the survival of a state-level national identity and gives urgency to elite attempts to retain power through the moulcling of ciLizenship. As these pressures increase citizens seek, and are encouraged, to rally around a national identity which retrenches the benefits afforded by the state against the external hordes. These political pressures contribute to the emergence of discourses of inclusion and exclusion-the 'us' and 't.hem'-which then form the basis of a strategic and exclusionary nationalism.
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The rise of strategically determined nationalisms is facilitated by the obvious fact that nations and states relate to each other in complex ways. Nationalism 's 'us' and 'them ' are constituted by boundaries of inclusion and exclusion both above a nd below the level of the state. The sense of belonging may then refer solely to the ' natio' a condition of belonging felt relating to a local community (Brennan 1990: 45 ) . Nation-building seeks to intervene and create new broad-based loyalties, overcoming divisions. But in many states, maJ·ginal or minority groups, especially those of indigenous extraction, are excluded-intentionally or no t-from the nation-building process, especially where nomadic gro ups remained mobile well after the erection of borders. States, like Somalia and Botswana, once regarded as relatively ethnically h omogenous, used such perceptions to drive misguided assimilationist projects (Besteman 1999; Werbner 2002) . Documenting increasing resistance to assimilation in Botswana, Solway notes:
.. . ' minority' groups do not want to seize the state ... they are not irredentist or nationally secessionist. It is no t Botswana cit1ze nship that is in question, but the terms of that citizenship. J. \nd it is not the Botswana nation that is in question, bu t rather its cultural basis and terms of inclusivity ( Similarly, Flint and de Waal argue th at in Da1fur, where people had " become Sudanese" (2005: I 4) over three generations of cultural and political change, "[i] n the 1980s the complaint of most Darli.lfians was not that the process of ' becoming Sudanese' d enied them their own unique cultu ral heritage, but that the government in Khartoum was not treating them as fi.tll citizens" {Flint and de vVaal 2005: 16) . In contrast, South Africa's new coat of a rms depicts rock art figures and takes as its motto 'Diverse people unite' from an extinct ' Bushman' language. Alan Barnarcl, well aware of the inequities in Botswana, argues:
... it is significant ... that the K hoisan, and Bushman a t that-with the lowest status of all South Africa's peoples-were chosen to embody the mythical charter of the new South Afl;can multicultu ral nation .. . through them a virtual primordial identity for the nation as a whole can be imagi ned (2004: 19) .
It is inevitable that Aii·ica's states will struggle with political, ethnic and li nguistic cleavages, yet it is what politicians do with those cleavages that matters. \Vhilst Cameroon is home to "over 250 linguistically identifiable ethnic groups", Awasom argues that it is the colonial legacy which remains the basis of the strongest societal cleavage (this volume: 145).
I 0 SARA OORMAl'l, OM<IEL ~I.AMME·rr AND PAUL NUCENT Although the reunification of the two Cameroons produced an officially bilingual state, Francophones constituted a majority. The minority Anglophones developed secessionist tendencies in the 1990s after feeling increasingly marginalised. Recognising that language "invites people to unite, but does not force them to" (Renan 1990: 16) , the Cameroonian state attempted to reduce linguistic differences as a source of identification and exclusion by drawing upon pre-colonial ethnic ties across this line of cleavage. However separate educational systems have continued to reproduce a sense of difference. Since Cameroon remains Francophone dominated, tJ1e frustrations of the Anglophone minority continue, overlaid with local and ethnic tensions, and transient periods of co-operation need greater permanency in order to hold a divided nation together. Nation-building tactics in Tanzanian schools have proven somewhat more resilient, but as Bertz (this volume) argues, the reduction of overt racial divides and labelling reflects a carefully maintained ambigui ty, not any simple resolution of difference.
'Twenty-Four How:r Hate' or ' JIV/w is JiVIw'
In times of pressure an internal other against which a 'pure' national identity is cast, becomes utilised as a political tool. Post-independence governments have been faced with the challenge of cementing a national identity within a state container that both divides communities and encloses multiple ethnic groups. T his embodies itself in the identification of strangers, usually outside the state borders, tl1rough political agitations against foreigners (Hobsbawrn 1993: 163) , whose negativity is contrasted to a positive self-image. In the cases discussed below, the 'outsiders' are often t11ose who migrated into the region during the colonial period, or even before, and whose cL<tim to citizenship is thus seen as less 'authentic'. In Cameroon, for example, Sam Hickey notes that "tlle recent phase of democratisation (re)establish[ ed] a virulent form of primary patriotism based around the politics of belonging and 'nativeness"', confronting pastoral peoples "with the origins of their subordination and marginality" (this volume: 99). Similar processes engulfed even areas of Cameroon without such profound differences of livelihood, where" . .. (democratization] embodied the dichotornizing representation of Carneroonians or their classification into two categories: supporters and opposants (oppositionists), good and bad citizens, responsible and irresponsible subjects, patriots and the non-patriots, autoc!ttones and allogenes, allies and enemies, natives and strangers .. . " in desperate attempts by political incumbents to retain power (Ndjio 2006: 25-26) .
Similar efforts to construct and maintain insider-outsider divisions took even more violent forms in Cote d 'Ivoire after the death of Houphouet-Boigny. T hrough a totalitarian glip over the state, President Gbagbo has encouraged and utilised ethnic hatred, xenophobia and violence to maintain power. Government repression following an attempted coup in 2003, based upon questioning who-is-who in d1e Ivoirian context, combined modern political and primordial ethnic face ts to mobilise an exclusivist identity within the state. To entrench the power of the ruling Front Populaire lvoi1ian, a dual demonised other has been created ilirough government propaganda, a rereading of history and state controlled media. Against these 'others' the 'authentic Ivoirian' can be located positively and exclusively through claims to territorial autochthony (Marshall-Fratani, this volume).
T he selective use of history has strengthened Cote d'Ivoire's borders. Widely ignored and given less credence in the colonial era than today, state borders have been invigorated as political, social and economic boundaries, gaining authority as markers of belonging. T hese markers have provided for the exclusion of d1e importance of immigrants to the success of ilie Ivoirian miracle, denigrating 'immigrants' and their families as non-nationals and non-citizens whilst simultaneously casting 'authentic' Ivoirians in positive terms. Within the state, the creation of a psychological boundary by the FPI around its historical and ethnic base in the south has cast northern lvoirians as inherently suspect. The new internal border created by the rebellion since 2002 " Marshall-Fratani suggests, "has only concrerised an imaginary national border already represented in the minds of many lvoirians" (this volume: 62).
Likewise, Tanzania, despite its record as a successful nation-building experiment has, since the re-introduction of multi-party democracy, seen opposition parties and their supporters in Zanzibar stigmatised as 'Arab' and 'foreign' (Cameron 2002) . Not dissimilarly, Mugabe's campaign against political and non-governmental opposition since 2000 consisted of denying their right to represent Zimbabweans (Dorman 2003) . T he revival of exclusive nationalism in Zimbabwe utilised a coercive consolidation of state power mobilised through emotive discourses of a two-nation state as a colonial legacy. Equating Zimbabwean-ness with black-ness, and white as the external-imperial other; the ZANU-Pf government sidelined effective opposition through the saturation or media 12 SARA OORMAJ'I, OM<IEL ~I.AMME·rr AND PAUL NUCENT with government propaganda and the labelling of opposition parties as black puppets of the white project. With a highly mobilised and repressive state apparatus as well as militant youth groups and a tightly controlled pro-government media, ZANU-PF have rewritten the history of Zimbabwe to frame a new notion of nationhood and citizenship. The control of the media and mass entertainment through films and music has allowed the dualistic base of the new Zimbabwean identity to insidiously enter everyday culture (Raftopoulos, this volume).
But the creation of second-class citizenry within a state is not a new phenomenon, even within Africa. As Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja shows, these have been successful and durable political tools across the Great Lakes region, particularly in the former Belgian territories of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. The emergence of the Cor!federati.on des Associations 1iibales du Katarrga (CONAKAT ) in 1958 promoted the interests of the 'authentic Katangans', juxtaposed against a second class Kasaian citizenry (Nzongola-Ntalaja this volume). The dominant political grouping exercised complete control over the definition of 'authentic' versus questionable ciLi.zenship. National claims to citizenship were predicated on local claims to belonging, rather than vice-versa. In tl1e 1960s emotively politicised Katangan identity was mobilised in an ethnic cleansing of second class Kasaians. Subsequently, the ruling elite drew upon primordialist ideas as well as modernist interpretations of identity to define exclusive, 'authentic' Congolese using selective interpretations of geographic and ethnic histories. Even though protected by law, citizenship rights gave little protection at times of etlmic cleansing and genocide. Nzongola-Ntalaja reminds us of the complexity of identities, reflecting status, occupation, physical characteristics but fixed under colonial rule, and patron-client ties, and of the permeability of borders in the region, as conHicts flow across states. These processes reveal how the construction of an ethnicised boundary of inclusion, the Hutu-as-Rwandan nation, allowed Hutu extremists to attempt to retain power through the creation of the demonised Tutsi 'other'. Utilising a history carved out of claims to historical oppression and an imminent threat of re-oppression, state controlled media provided a 'Twenty-four Hours Hate' to mobilise the 'Hutu nations' citizens'. Seen as "an extreme attempt not only to purge the 'Hutu nation' of tl1e Tutsi, but also to actively engender a vision of the 'Hutu nation' in the minds of an othenvise diverse and fi·agmented local populace" (Baines 2003: 479 ) the genocide embodied nationalism at its most powerC ul and destructive.
Making Nationalism 'Real'! T!te Role qf History and Education
The defence of national boundaries is predicated upon a claim to historical legitimacy. T he projection of an exclusive historical project, often based upon a claim to oppression and subjugation, provides an initial boundary. The expression of this historical grievance forms an integral part of the (re)interpretarion of history employed by the nation's political elite, or by dissident communities. T his mutability of the past, where "[w]ho controls the past. .. controls the future; who controls the present controls the past" (Orwell 1999: 30) is key to Afi-ican citizenship debates. As Renan articulated, the formation of a nation is crucially dependent upon forgetting and unity comes from brutality (1990: 11). Formalised historical teaching affords governments a mechanism, which allows a specific version of (national) history to be taught in keeping with the nation-buLlding project. A common history is promoted, often of oppression, to engender a sense of social cohesion and group membership to the majority population, whilst inculcating beliefS and socialising the population into a particular viewpoint (Ranger 1985: 9) . Through this, an 'other' is created and cast in a negative historical light against which the positive in-group identity is juxtaposed. In turn, access to this education will provide for the subsequent (re)interpretation of events, withi n the continual process of nation-building and reaffirmation.
Post-independence Tanzania's national project and education policy was under pinned with "desires for egali tarianism and integration through the force of a unifYing nationalism" (Bertz this volume: I 62). Colonial-era education policy had reinforced social divisions and claims !or citizenship through "set notions of watertight compartments, some with superiority, others with inferiority and still others with hatred and ridicule" (.Morrison 1976: 78 in Bertz tll..is volwne: 16< 1 } Such a policy, employed for political gain by the dominant elite, has been used in many countries with two main purposes: the perperuation of economic and social dominance by the privileged group, and the promotion of ideas of national exclusivism. In contrast, following the end of colonialism, President Nyerere used integrated non-racialist education tO reduce potentially divisive historical differences between Indian and African populations. The post-apartheid South African education system sinl..ilarly seeks to provide an education based upon equality, egalitarianism and a fundamental respect for human rights (Republic of South Africa 1995). Apartheid policy provided segregated and diflerential education, a policy which embedded ideas of differential nationhood and citizenship within these groups (West 1987: I) . T hese racially based divisions are slowly be. ing removed through a system of racially integrated education and a common curriculum. Progress towards healing the divisions of the past is slow. Class divisions now replicate previously legislated racial divisions, although attempts are being made to incorporate education into wider policies of social integration and restitution. T he simple provision of facilities is crucial to the spread of equal citizenship (CALS 2005) . A further challenge lies in reconciling a history of difference with a narrative of national unity in the making.
In Zimbabwe, attempts to meet this challenge flotmdered in political exigencies. After some years of rewriting hist01y textbooks and curricula to redress the colonial accounts (Barnes 2005) , histoty was harnessed to "divid [e] up the nation into revolutionaries and sell-outs" (Ranger 2004) . Utilising formal education institutions, TV, music and youth camps 'patriotic history' escalated the division between the pro-ZANU-PF faction, and opponents both black and white. Depicting the dominant divisions in the nation building project as falling along racial lines, and between urban and rural consti tuencies, ZANU-PF policy expelled 'alien' whites from the body politic (Raftopoulos this volume: 185) and paternalistically coerced 'misguided Africans' caricatured as "badly raised children who had strayed out of 'our [ZANU-PF's] world view"' (Raftopoulos this volume: 185) back into the fold. Rather than seeking to communicate across the divisions, the ruling elite generated a particularly vitriolic nationalism excluding sections of the population from their citizenship tights.
The constant exposure to a contrived set of ideas, as with the strict media and educational controls in Zimbabwe or the infamous radio broadcasts in Rwanda before the genocide, led to mass support and hysteria. A selective and emotive use of history and contemporary threats encourages the nascent sense of nation and citizenship. \Ninston Smith's experience of the daily 'Two IVIinutes Hate' in 1984 was such:
.. . that it was impossible to avoid joining in .. . A hideo us ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, t O smash faces with a sledge hammc1; seemed to flow through the whole group of people like an electric cmrent, tlU'ning one even against one's wiU into a grimacing, screaming luna tic (Orwell 1949: 11 ) .
The manifestation of the 'grimacing, screaming lunatic' iJl a number of Afi·ican countries has been evident in both genocides and the daily violence confronted by 'others'.
Race, Space & Xellophobes
The settler states of southern Africa faced particular challenges of reconciling the competing settler nationalisms, and redressing the economic imbalances that had been built into their states. South Africa's historical trajectory which disaggregated an increasingly integrated population along ethnic and de-nationalised lines, in contrast to most British colonial policies (Moodley and Adam 2000: 51) , created a multi-nationalised state. The transition to democracy in South Africa challenged the foundation of every aspect of social, political and economic life in th e apartheid period-racial identity. The social hierarchy which ingrained notions of superiority and inferiorit)~ and formed the basis of the inclusion or exclusion of groups economically, politically and spatially supposedly came to an end in 1994. Government policies of redress have sought to mitigate historical inequalities, but there has been a failure of effective political leadership to recast the template of social and national identity (Alexander tlus volume: 21 0). Perceptions of marginaJisation have instead encouraged an emergence of a politicised 'coloured' identity; Afrikaner claims to identity are being re-conceptualised around minority rights, language, ethnicity and religion (Pillay 2005). Non-racialism, "the founding myth of the new South African nation" (Alexander 1995: 6) , has failed and racial identities remain vital in the new South Africa (Erasmus 200 l; Zegeye 200 I) .
At the sam e time, chauvinistic nationalism readily overcomes these differences when perceived threats to the economic and social security of South Africans appear. New and old boundaries of inclusion and exclusion overlap as a latent national identity is expressed against (black) immigrants. Alexander (this volume: 2 15) comments that 'judging by the ease with which many South Africans have slipped into xenophobic behaviour, national chauvinism is latent among aU strata of the society." As the end of apartheid removed internal, racialised boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, the creation of a new nation required a new 'other' which would cut across old boundaries. As in the Cote d'Ivoire, the Congo and elsewhere, imnugrants form the new 'other' in South African political discourse. This is none too surprising give that apartheid education and the media never really considered South Africa as part of Africa. Ongoing media reports about 'hordes', 'barbarians' and the links between immigration, crime and unemployment sensationalise tllis division ( The state's refusal to permit the creation of internal 'others' encourages the nation to define who is properly 'us' in opposition to those they are allowed to call 'them'.
The Soil qf the Ancest01:r
Access to land symbolises local or regional citizenship in many Afi·ican societies. The ultimate proof of belonging is the ability to possess-or at least make use of-part of the territory within which one resides. In this way the denial of land is also a denial of being and of belonging (Moore 2005). T he claim to land across Africa is typically expressed in terms of the rights of first comcrs (such as the Guan in Ghana) or rights established by vi rtue of conquest (for example the Ngoni subgroups in Central Africa). This means that history is typically taken very seriously indeed and very old claims are hotly contested. The domination of historical discourse by ruling elites also contributes to tlus process, as claims to indigeneity and ancestry are often predicated on historical understandings. But we should not forget that tl1e elites who produce history often rely on the work of local historians and 'peasant intellectuals' who have constantly sought to keep their claims alive through the colonial period to the present (Feierman 1990) The twin concepts of people and place have been used as interlinked means through which to define citizenship.
Anti-colonial nationalism was often chiven by historical grievances relating tO the exproptiation of land and concomitant removal of legitimacy and livelihood from local populations. But this continues to be utilised in the debates of nationhood and citizenship by post-colonial leaders, as "attachment to one's community and, through it, to the soil of the ancestors or the homeland, is a ftmdamental dimension in tl1e notion of citizenship in Africa" (Nzongola-Ntalaja this volume: 71 ). For peasants, fanners, and farm workers in Zimbabwe, land has been a persistently evocative subject. Utilising anti-colonial discourse, the ZANU-PF government has expropriated white owned farmland, amidst claims to a modern day African Robin Hood-of taking land away from white 'settlers' to provide resources for 'Africans' (Ru therford this volume). Land has been given to those citizens (black) who voice allegiance to the state, whilst simultaneously denying any legitimacy to claims of citizenship and ownership to both white and black Africans who support opposition groups, reinforcing the overlapping of Zimbabwean-ness with Zanu-PF-ness.
Zimbabwean farm workers-though black-have been excluded from the land 'redistribution' process. Like the 'northerners' in Cote d'lvoire, Zimbabwean farm-workers are the descendents of colonialera farm labour migrants. Even more than their peers in West Africa, the Zimbabwean farm-workers have remained economically, socially, and politically marginalised. Although lormally entitled to citizenship and the vote these political rights became increasingly contested after 2000, at which point they also found themselves denied work and land: "the intimate tie made between land and sovereignty" (Rutherlord this volume: 112). By linking the ownership of land with an anti-colonial discourse, Mugabe has compromised the link between property, state, and citizenship.
· within processes of accessing land in South Africa,J ames illustrates how the power and politics involved with this process have travelled full circle to traditional means of accessing land in South Africa. Before and during apartheid "it was the systematic denial of rights in landed property, and their aliena6on from those who had previously held title to landed property, that stood as a symbol for the denial of citizenship" (this volume: 124), and through thjs created classes of citizens through the linking of people to place. The alienation of land by white settlers transformed KhoeKhoe and Bantu peoples into subjects, initially of a trading company as embryonic state, and later of the colonial and apartheid states. The linkage of people and place remains in postapartheid South Africa, and land remains symbolic of citizenship. T he land restitution process is inextricably linked to the forging of a new national identity in South Africa.
In modern states, the government's relationship with the individual vis-a-vis land and the establishment of property rights requires the state to protect these for the individual and in doing so not only protects the individual but incorporates them into the state (Verdery 1998: 298) . This lies at the heart of process of land restitution, as certain groups pursue the idea that "only if people hold property independently of the state can they enjoy the status of the modern citizen, thus escaping from the dependence of the tradi tionalist 'subject'." (James this volume: 139). O thers seek to access land through traditional tenure systems, where the poor receive usufruct rights through tribute to power holders or where aJJ land is essential.ly family land anyway. Hughes (2006) in fact, argues that communal tenure has provided more security than other forms of tenure in Zimbabwe. But in many areas, where land would have been accessed through chiefs, agents and brokers increasingly mediate between the disenfranchised and the state for access to land. Those who seek to access land in this lhshion may find that their claims tO full citizenship within the community are diminished, even where their legal citizenship is not in doubt. Land remains symbolic of citizenship and nationlwod, despite the encroachment of more 'modern' understandings of legal citizenship.
At the present time, the World Bank and other donors are pushing the idea that A..lrican agriculture is in crisis because of the lack of security of tenu re. A proper land registration system, it is argued, would solve the problem in a country like Ghana. The attempt to privatise land in this way is likely to prove extremely contentious, reviving submerged claims and counter-claims about who really owns particular parcels of land. Far from producing greater security, in pans of Africa the result is likely to that of spreading a sense of insecuri ty as people fret about the possibility of exclusion. In the cities, where this process is most advanced, urban autochthony politics is on the tise. Even the ostensibly benign promise of equal access to land for all citizens across national space, such as was embodied in the Senegalese National Domain Law of 1964, has been acutely conten tious (Galvan 2004) . Indeed many attribute the rise of Casamance nationalism precisely to the belated irnplementation of the law in that region after 1979. This was widely interpreted as a land-grab against the Jola by the \:Volof and other northern Senegalese seeking to flee the dustbowls created by groundnut farming (Boone 2003: 132) .
In many parts of Africa, pastoralism has been seen by state-makers and nation-builders as a threat to the rational norm. Pastoralists challenge ideas about boundaries and land-use and when there are shortages they often come into conflict with agriculturalists. Sam Hickey highlights the ways in which the Mbororo Fulani of North West Cameroon "located at the intersection of citizenship, clientelism and marginality" (this volume: 98}, have been denied citizenship rights. Semi-nomadic pastoralists, their way of life was easily distint, ruishable fi·om pre-existing sedentary farming communities through religious and social organisational rulferences. At the same time, the 'moment' of state-formation, in this case during the colonial, rather than postcolonial period, shaped their oppornmities and the very nature of citizenship within the new state. In the post-colonial period, Mbororo distrust of Western education and its incompatibility with their pastoral lifestyle (Hickey this volume: 90} fi.trther excluded them from processes which would have equipped them with the tools to participate in the shaping of post-colonial Cameroonian citizenship. Instead, the Mbororo maintained neo-patrimonial relations with the colonial and post-colonial governments, but have been simultaneously seen as the internal 'other'. The creation of a boundary of exclusion within the state has reinforced the M.bororo's marginality, as the withholding of citizenship allows only for tenant rights to land. The presence of an excluded community within the state borders provides the government with a powerful and in1mediate 'danger' against which to frame their preferred national identity, and reinforce their political position, revealing how the construction of citizenship necessarily involves relations and processes of othering, marginality and clientelism, and that these then need to be understood as entwined rather than as necessarily contradictory or oppositionaL Citi;:.enshijJ )· Jli:ctims or Victors?
Working with a problematic colonial legacy, political elites have manipulated history, land, and social and economic factors to exert a collective sense of identity over their citizens. The claiming of control over the defining of citizenship and nationhood provides unrivalled political power. For leaders in unstable and fragmented states, control over citizenship entrenches their position in the power hierarchy of the society. To maintain this position it is necessary for them to cast a negative other against which to rally their nation. Divisions must then be manipulated to exacerbate tensions and foster a strong sense of oppositional collective identity, or to overcome differences to strengthen and broaden the nation. Increasing pressures on states, resource control and security in an increasingly fragmented world mean that nationhood and citizenship remain key elements of Africa's geo-political order. The most effective means to maintain nationhood remains to play upon fear-through the creation of strangers.
Yet, many of our authors remain optimistic a bou t the redeeming power of citizenship. Will Reno identifies the nascent citizenship demands that emerge even within violent struggles over political power. Rejecting accoun ts of African guerrillas as simply predators, he interrogates the experiences of soldiers as proto-politicians. He suggests that in some cases, social contracts are negotiated between insu rgents and local communities amongst whom they fight, in the form of rules of behaviour, reciprocities, traditional institutions, comprising a "framework for collective defence" (this volume: 228). Importantly, we need to remember that the "real goal of most predatory insurgencies is to become the next rulers of the country" (Reno, this volume: 225) , And, certainly, in post-liberation Eritrea, and quasi-independent Somahland, understandings of nationhood and obligation, shaped during the war have profoundly shaped loyalties to the state and the nation, and contributed to contingent definitions of citizenship.
In many of the cases discussed below, the introduction of multi-party politics is identified as a stress-point for political systems. Both at independence and since 1990, electoral competition has " raised the stakes on citizenship" (Young this volume: 259) . Despite this, several of the authors below point to the possibility of democratisation as a solution to the crisis of citizenship. Georges Nzongola-Ntal<Ua calls for citizenship and political communities to include non-indigenous peoples: "it makes no sense to deny people a right to the land tl1ey have lived on for centuries" (tlus volume: 78). But, he insists that political institutions need also respect indigenous land rights, increase social justice, and provide a democratic culture, if this is to work (this volume: 78-79). Craw:[ord Young, similarly, notes that if peace is to return to war-torn states, basic sets of agreement on democratic institutions and the shape of the state must exist in order lor agreements about the nation and citizenship thereof to be concluded (this volume: 241 ). Sam Hickey's study of the M'bororo fi.trther highlights the potential for progressive politics emerging fi·om the margins.
But all of the case studies below reveal the depth and complexity of political and social identities in post-colonial Africa. These are not issues that can be resolved though political decisions, or legislation, nor can they be resolved by the seizure of state power. It is not simply 'a stmggle to the death for state power' but as Marshall-Frat:ani describes the struggle in Cote d'lvoire, but "the redefinition of the content of citizenship and the conditions of sovereignty" {this volume: 31 ). Given the intensity of these struggle, "deeply held sentiments and sedirnented institut:ional arrangements" (Ru therford this volume: 118) will not easily be shifted.
Conclusion: Contested Nationalisms
It was widely anticipated that the ending of the Cold War would remove some of the factors, including proxy wars and arms sales, which had perpetuated conflict and propped up great dictators. The eventual collapse of Mengistu's Ethiopia, Siad Barre's Somalia and Mobutu's Zaire, all of which had enj oyed external support in combating secessionist threats, proceeded according to the script once that support fell away. But the 'decade of democratisation' which followed was also accompanied by the Rwandan genocide and unprecedented conflict across the Great Lakes region; brutal wars of attrition in Sierra Leone and Liberia; the spectacular collapse of the Ivorian state; renewed secessionist demands in Tanzania, Cameroon, and Senegal; and divisive struggles over land in Zimbabwe and beyond. South Africa was emerging from its own low-intensity conflict at precisely tl1e same historical conjuncture. Here the level of daily violence actually receded, and yet xenophobia towards immigrant populations assumed a prominence that had not been anticipated. The one common link is that these conflicts-of words and weapons-have been about battles over state-formation (and re-formation) and the morphology of the nation. Identity politics has played its part, but what is often missed is that the conflict has also turned on contested nationalisms, shaped by divergent readings of history. The object is to shape and control the state (Dorman 2005) , a process involving exclusionary agendas which sit uneasily with the trappings of democracy. The perceived imperative of re-making the state is attributable in part to the failure of earlier exercises in nation-building. Lonsdale, speaking of post-colonial Kenya, emphasised that while President Kenyatta created a 'reasonably stable and prosperous state', his failure to deal with Kenya's ethnic politics meant that he created 'a false sense of both nationhood and political stability' (Lonsdale 2004: 2 15) . This could equally well stand as the epitaph for Houphouet-Boigny who was content to fudge the issue of what it meant to be Ivorian. The supporters of Laurent Gbagbo have sought to 'clear up' this ambiguity in a way which, if taken to its logical conclusion, would involve the deportation of a large section of the population.
What has often been commented upon is that in a continent which was wracked by conflict at the turn of the millennium, very little of it was ostensibly about borders-traditionally Europe's bugbeat: This is not quite true of the Horn, where both the Ogaden and the Eritrean-Ethiopian wars were partly about boundary issues, or of the Great Lakes region. But as a generalisation it contains a considerable amount of truth. However, what it ignores is that the relative stability of the international borders arises precisely from the fact that states and border peoples alike have a lot invested in their maintenance. Tlus investment is also what makes actors insistent about having the right to define who is alien and who belongs, thereby excluding not just people from neighbouring countties but even eo-nationals from other regions (as in the Democratic Republic of Congo). States may seek to clain1 the exclusive right to define citizenslup, but when their coercive and persuasive power is equally limited it may be easier to defer to 'local' agendas. Although it is only right that the divisive politics of political elites be studied as strategies of survival by a Mugabe or a Gbagbo, what should not be forgotten i.s that there are other regional and local elites who often call the shots. The struggle to define the content of citizenship therefore involves negotiations between actors at different levels, whose bargaining positions reflect their perceptions of core constituencies and others which are essentially expendable. The casualties tend to be those who are stigmatised at the local level-in this case including urban settings-and who are considered expendable by the wielders of power at the national level. The same clearly works in reverse. Hence being Nigerian in contemporary Johannesburg, or white in rural Zimbabwe, is to fed decidedly exposed.
T his vol ume offers some sense of the differing possibilities and outcomes across Africa which arise out of the working through of some key variables-including histories of colo nialism a nd post-colonial state constr uction, patterns of social inequality, la nd pressu res and the geographical location of critical resources. But these construct the structural background against which actors debate e ntitlements and negotiate the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.
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